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GAULT AND CALIFORNIA
By ROBERT GAnDNER*

TEE United States

Supreme Court has developed a Delphic system
of warning of things to come. Thus, in the criminal field, Miranda v.
2
Arizona' had been presaged by its forerunner, Escobedo v. Illinois.
So, also, in the juvenile court field, Kent v. United States3 foretold
further explorations in the troublesome realm of juvenile justice.
The world waited. Then, on May 15, 1967, the wait was over. The
other shoe dropped. In re Gault4 was decided.
To some, Gault was the death knell of the juvenile court-to
(Until its current session, the
others, Gault was long overdue.
court had never reviewed a state juvenile court case.) Certainly, in
some states, the application of the principles set forth in Gault must
be creating consternation akin to hysteria. However, it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the philosophy, history, problems, or
practices of the juvenile court outside of California, but to examine
the California Juvenile Court Law in light of Gault, and to ascertain,
if possible, wherein we had anticipated its directions, admonitions, and
principles; to examine the legislative reaction to that case; and to
explore the questions left unanswered, both by Gault and the California Legislature.
The history of the juvenile court in California has been one of
strife between two groups who might be described, at the risk of oversimplification, as the Purists and the Constitutionalists-the Purists
being those who believe completely in the parens patriae, protective,
social welfare philosophy of the juvenile court movement, and the
Constitutionalists, those who advocate full constitutional rights and
safeguards for minors.
The Purists would probably include almost all of the behavioral
scientists-probation, correctional, and welfare personnel-and, very
possibly, a majority of the juvenile court judges, particularly those
appointed to that duty on a full-time basis. Strangely enough, the
Purists find as somewhat uncomfortable bedfellows their severest
critics, the police, for the simple reason that law enforcement is very
easy when not encumbered with awkward constitutional limitations.
Police officers are prone to criticize juvenile court dispositions-but
not the practice of trying cases on the probation officer's report. The
Constitutionalists, in turn, would probably include a minority of the
*
'

Judge of the Superior Court, Orange County, California.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).

2
3 383 U.S. 541 (1966).

4 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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juvenile court judges and those few lawyers who have had experience
in the juvenile court. The public? Well, due to the veil of secrecy
which confidentiality has drawn over the juvenile court, the public
simply does not have the foggiest idea what goes on in that court.
Until 1961 the Purists were clearly in the saddle. The pre-1961
Juvenile Court Law was "pure" juvenile court law, that is, since juvenile proceedings were not criminal in nature, 5 the minor was not
entitled to the constitutional rights and safeguards of an adult charged
with crime. In those few cases which found their way to the appellate
courts, the Purist philosophy was followed-almost without exception. Unhappily, these cases were rare, probably because few lawyers
appeared in juvenile court, which, in turn, could be traced to the fact
that there was no provision in the law for advice as to the right of
counsel-nor was there any provision for the appointment of counsel.6
A few examples will suffice. For example, it was held:
(1) The minor had no right to notice, since notice to his parents
7
was deemed sufficient to meet the demands of due process.
(2) There was no requirement that the notice contain a copy
of the petition or advice of the nature of the proceedings or of the
facts alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the courtmere notice of the time and place of the hearing being sufficient.8
(3) The minor had no right to a jury trial.9
(4) The reasonable doubt rule did not apply, and any legally
10
sufficient and substantial evidence would sustain the court's order.
(5) Hearsay evidence was admissible in the jurisdictional 1
phase of the case. Former section 639 of the Welfare and Institutions Code' 2 provided that "[t]he probation officer shall. . . inquire
into the cause for which each such person is brought before the juvenile court, and shall make his report in writing to the judge thereof."'13
This report, when filed and considered by the judge, "must be re5 Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 369, § 736, at 1037 (formerly Cal. Well. & Inst'ns
Code § 736, now CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 503); People v. Dotson, 46 Cal.
2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).

6 See generally Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10 STAN. L. Rsv.
471, 500-04 (1958).
7 In re Florance, 47 Cal. 2d 25, 300 P.2d 825 (1956).
8 Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 369, § 726, at 1034 (formerly Cal. Well. & Inst'ns
Code § 726). See generally Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10 STAN. L.
REv. 471, 490-92 (1958).
9 In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924).
10 Cf. In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947).
1" For the benefit of the tyro in the never-never land of the juvenile
court, the jurisdictional phase is comparable to the plea and trial in the
adult court.
12 Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 369, § 639, at 1027 (repealed 1961).
13 Id.
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garded as legal evidence."1 4 Thus, the practice of trying contested
cases on the probation officer's report was common.' 5
(6) The minor had no right to bail pending a hearing.' Former
section 828 of the Welfare and Institutions Code' 7 provided that the
judge in his discretion might allow bail. The right to bail, that traditional buffer between the individual and the arbitrary judge, thus
was completely emasculated.
(7) There was no duty to advise the minor of his right to coun18
sel.
(8) There was no duty to warn the minor against self-incrimination.'

9

(9) The defense of once in jeopardy was not available to the
minor.20
(10) The minor was entitled to counsel of his own choice at the
jurisdictional phase of the case 2 ' but not after he had been made a
ward of the court and further proceedings were being had for a change
in custody based on his alleged misbehavior.22 Pristine logic, carried
to its logical conclusion, is irresistible. The state, operating through
the juvenile court judge, is, by reason of the wardship, the parent of
the minor, and whoever heard of a lawyer interfering between the
rights of a parent and a child?-a bit of judicial broken field running
which would do credit to the legendary Red Grange.
In only one case was the warning hand of the court raised, the
oft-quoted case of In re Contreras,23 in which Justice Thomas P. White,
proceeding to set aside a finding based on no legally sufficient evidence, said:
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor
to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of
crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction
presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason.
Courts cannot and will not shut their eyes and ears to everyday contemporary happenings.
It is common knowledge that such an adjudication when based
upon a charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a
blight upon the character of and is a serious impediment to the future
of such minor. Let him attempt to enter the armed services of his
country or obtain a position of honor and trust and he is immediately

14 In re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App. 2d 219, 223, 192 P.2d 781, 783 (1948).
15 See, e.g., In re Garcia, 201 Cal. App. 2d 662, 20 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1962)
(decided under pre-1961 juvenile law).
16 In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 364 (1952) (dictum).
'7 Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 369, § 828, at 1045 (repealed 1961).
is People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 364 (1955).
19 In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947).
20 People v. Silverston, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953).
21 In re Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 P. 965 (1920).
22 In re McDermott, 77 Cal. App. 109, 246 P. 89 (1926).
23 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952).
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confronted with his Juvenile Court record. And further, as in this
case, the minor is taken from his family, deprived of his liberty, and
confined in a state institution. True, the design of the Juvenile Court
Act is intended to be salutary, and every effort should be made to
further its legitimate purpose, but never should it be made an instrument for the denial to a minor of a constitutional right or of a
guarantee afforded by law to an adult.24

By the late 1950's the California juvenile court picture was one of
a checkerboard of inconsistent practices and procedures varying from
county to county and from judge to judge, with the recognition of constitutional rights for minors depending almost entirely on the discretion of the individual judge. The original Juvenile Court Law of 1903
had not had a basic revision since 1915. It was a hodgepodge of
amendments and amendments to amendments. Thus, in 1957 the
Governor appointed a Citizens' Committee to survey and evaluate the
administration of juvenile justice in the state. In November of 1960
the Commission reported its recommendations, 2 which were adopted,
almost in their entirety, by the legislature in the Juvenile Court Law
of 1961.2 6 Among the recommendations of the Commission was that
"every child and his parents have a right to a fair hearing on the
allegations which have brought the minor before the juvenile court
and all parties should have their legal and constitutional rights pro27
tected."
It is not the purpose of this article to examine the complete Juvenile Court Law of 1961 nor to attempt an evaluation of all its successes
and failures. Suffice to say, it was a gallant, and in many ways a
successful, effort to bridge the gap between the social welfare concept
of the Purists and the legalistic complaints of the Constitutionalists.
Its existence makes the impact of Gault much less dramatic than will
be the case in most other jurisdictions.
Just what does Gault say and how did the 1961 law bear up under
its scrutiny?
Primarily, let us look at Gault.
First, nothing is to be gained from a prolonged discussion of the
four concurring, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting,
opinions of Justices Black, White, Harlan and Stewart except to observe that Justice Black, as an avowed absolutist, went all the way
for constitutional rights,28 that Justice White found fault with the
record,2 9 that Justice Harlan argued over the standards established
24

Id. at 789-90, 241 P.2d at 633.

25 GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMvUSSION ON JUVENILE JusTIcE (1960).
26 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2, at 3459-503.
27 GoVEMNOR's SPECIAL STUDY CovnwIssioN ON JUVENILE JusTIcE pt. 1, at
11 (1960).

28 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59-64 (1957).
29

Id. at 64-65.
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0
by the majority by which due process was to be measured,3 and
the futility
Justice Stewart dissented in toto with a classic example of
31
panacea.
a
as
doctrine
constitutional
to
of blind adherence
Second, just what does Gault not say? Explicitly, Gault limits
32
itself to what we in California call the "jurisdictional phase" of the
case. Gault concerns itself not with the pre-judicial nor with the postjudicial or dispositional process. 33 Gault placed strict limitations on
its holding:
We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These
relate to the proceedings about which a determination is made as
to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a result of alleged misthe consequence that he may be committed
conduct on his part, 3with
4
to a state institution.
Third, just what does Gault say? After a lengthy discussion of
the juvenile court movement in which the tenor is definitely that it
has not come up to the high expectations of its founders, Gault makes
the following basic determinations, each on a due process basis:
(1) Due process compels adequate notice.
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given
sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must "set forth

35
the alleged conduct with particularity."

(2) Due process compels advice to the minor and his family of
the right to counsel and the furnishing of counsel if they are unable
to afford same.
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that in respect to proceedings to determine
delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in
which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parent
must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or, if they are unable 3to afford counsel, that counsel
will be appointed to represent the child. 6

(3) Due process compels (in somewhat murky wording) that the
minor is entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, and to cross-examine them.
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to

Id.at 65-78.
In the course of his dissenting opinion Justice Stewart remarked: "In
that era [prior to juvenile courts] there were no juvenile proceedings, and a
child was tried in a conventional criminal court with all the trappings
of a conventional criminal trial. So it was that a 12-year-old boy named
James Guild was tried in New Jersey for killing Catherine Beakes. A jury
found him guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to death by hanging. The
sentence was executed. It was all very constitutional." Id. at 79-80.
32 See note 11 supra.
33 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
30
81

Id.
3s Id. at 33.
84

80

Id. at 41.
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adults.
. . . No reason is suggested or appears for a different rule in respect of sworn testimony in juvenile courts than in adult tribunals.
The recommendations in the Children's Bureau's "Standard for
Juvenile and Family Courts" are in general accord with our conclusions. They state that testimony should be under oath and that only
competent material and relevant evidence under rules applicable to
civil cases should be admitted in evidence.
. . . We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination
of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution
cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to
the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law
and constitutional requirements. 7

(4) It is suggested, but not made a matter of constitutional requirement, that there be the right to appeal, to a record or to a finding by the court.
[W]e need not rule on this question . . . . As the present case
illustrates, the consequences of failure to provide an appeal, to record
the proceedings, or to make findings or state the grounds for the
juvenile court's conclusion may be to throw a burden upon the machinery for habeas corpus, to saddle the reviewing process with the
burden of attempting to reconstruct a record, and to impose upon the
Juvenile Judge the unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination as to the events that transpired in the hearing before him.38

The Court also placed a stamp of approval, albeit in some cases
with reservations, on (a) handling juveniles separately from adults,
(b) avoiding the stigma of "criminal" by the classification of "delinquent," and (c) confidentiality of records.3 9
Now let us examine the 1961 California Juvenile Court Law and
see wherein (in the opinion of the legislature) it fell short of the
demands of Gault and the steps taken by the legislature to correct
these failings.
First, as to notice.
The provisions of the 1961 law pertaining to notice were explicit,
thorough, complete, extensive, and repetitious. For example:
Section 55440 provided for service of the findings and orders of
the referee upon a minor 14 years of age or older and upon his parents
or guardian, together with a written explanation of the right to a re41
view of the order by the juvenile court judge.
37

Id. at 55-57.

38 Id. at 58.
39 Id. at 22-25.
40 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 554.

41 It was not until a 1965 amendment (Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 393, § 1, at
1699) that the provision was made limiting notice to those 14 years of age
or older. Prior to that time there was no limitation and clerks and probation
officers found themselves in the embarrassing position of serving elaborate
notices on very young children, sometimes pinning same to the diaper, in an
effort to comply with the then law.
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Section 62742 provided that when a police officer takes the minor
before a probation officer, he "shall take immediate steps to notify
the minor's parents . . .that such minor is in custody and the place

where he is being held."
Section 63043 provided that if the probation officer decided to keep
the minor in custody, he should immediately file a petition, set the
matter for a detention hearing, and notify the parents or guardian
of the minor of the time and place of the hearing.
Section 63344 provided that at the hearing the minor, his parent
or guardian, should first be informed of the reasons why the minor is
taken into custody, the nature of juvenile court proceedings, and of
the right to counsel.
Section 63745 provided that if any parent did not have actual
notice of the detention hearing, he should have the right to a rehearing within 24 hours.
Section 65846 provided that upon the filing of the petition, a notice
of the hearing together with a copy of the petition should be served
upon the minor, his parents, guardian, or, if none, any adult relative
living in the county or near the court. Incidentally, as though to
anticipate the Gault demand that the notice shall "set forth the alleged
misconduct with particularity,"47 section 656 (f) 48 provided that the
petition must contain
A concise statement of facts, separately stated, to support the conclusion that the minor upon whose behalf the petition is being brought
is a person within the definition of each of the sections and subdivisions under which the proceedings are being instituted.

Section 65949 provided that the notice itself contain the same
information, plus a statement as to the right to counsel.
Section 66050 provided that the notice must be personally served
as soon as possible after the filing of the petition and at least 24 hours
before the time set for the hearing on the petition (5 days if served
outside the county). Section 70051 provided for a 7 day continuance
for appointment of counsel or to enable counsel to acquaint himself
with the case.
A readily apparent criticism of the notice provisions in the 1961
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 627.
43 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 630.
44 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 633.
42

45 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE

§

637.

46 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 658.

47

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).

48 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE

§ 656(f).

49 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 659.
50 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2, at 3479 (formerly Cal. Well. & Instns
Code § 660).
51 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 700.
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Juvenile Court Law was with respect to counsel. For some reason the
law ignored the right of counsel to be advised of events. Under the
stimulus of Gault, these notice sections were amended in 1967 to provide:
(1) That the minor himself be served with a copy of the petition
and notification of the time and place of the detention hearing in 601
52
and 602 cases.
(2) That the age for notice to the juvenile of the jurisdictional
hearing be lowered to 8 years in a 601 or 602 case.5 3
(3) That notice of the jurisdictional hearing be given to the
minor's attorney (and to the district attorney if he so requests).54
(4) That if the minor is detained, notice is to be given at least
5 days prior to the hearing unless the hearing is less than 5 days from
the date of the filing of the petition, in which case 24 hour notice is
provided. Ten days' notice is required for non-detained cases.55
(5) That upon reasonable notification by counsel representing
the minor, his parents, or guardian, notice is to be given to counsel in
the manner provided for notice to the parent or guardian of the
minor. 50
Next, as to the right to counsel. Here we were faced with two
peculiar provisions of the 1961 Law.
First, as to advice and waiver of the right to counsel.
Section 63357 provided that at the detention hearing the minor
and his parent or guardian should be informed of their right to be
"represented at every stage of the proceedings by counsel." So far
so good.
Section 63458 then provided that at this hearing counsel was to be
appointed "[w] hen it appears to the court that the minor or his parent
or guardian desires counsel . .. ."
This same language was carried over into section 700," 9 which
provided that at the jurisdictional hearing counsel was to be appointed
if desired.
These sections were rather casually approved by the majority of
52 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §

630, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1967, ch.

1356, § 3.
53

CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 658, as

amended, Cal. Stats. 1967, ch.

1356, § 5.
54 Id.
55 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE

1356, § 7.
56

CAL. WETF. & INST'Ns CODE

§ 660, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1967, ch.

§ 630.1, added by Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 507,

§ 1.
57 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 633.
58 CAL. WELr. & INST'NS CODE § 634
59 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 700.

(emphasis added).
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60
the California Supreme Court in In re Patterson
with a vigorous
dissent by then Justice Traynor, who pointed out that merely advising of the right to counsel and appointing counsel "if desired" did
not satisfy constitutional requirements and that an intelligent waiver
was necessary. 61 Parenthetically, it should be noted that some juvenile courts have been insisting on intelligent waiver in all cases in
spite of the latitude apparently offered by the "if desired" language
of the law.
While the subject of waiver is not mentioned in the specific holding of Gault, other language in the opinion makes it clear that intelligent waiver is a necessary part of proceedings having to do with the
appointment of counsel:
At the habeas corpus proceeding, Mrs. Gault testified that she
knew she could have appeared with counsel at the juvenile hearing.
This knowledge is not a waiver of the right to counsel which she and
her juvenile son had, as we have defined it. They had the right
expressly to be advised that they might retain counsel and to be confronted with the need for specific consideration of whether they did
or did not choose to waive the right. If they were unable to afford
to employ counsel, they were entitled in view of the seriousness of
the charge and the potential commitment, to appointed counsel, unless
they chose waiver. Mrs. Gault's knowledge that she could employ
counsel was not an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment" of
a fully known right.62
Thus it would appear clear that the "if desired" provisions had to
be removed from the law in cases arising under sections 601 and 602,63
64
and specific language providing for intelligent waiver substituted.
Second, as to the appointment of counsel in cases of indigency.
The same sections which provided for advice as to the right to
counsel provided for mandatory appointment where the minor was
charged with misconduct which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, but only permissive appointment in other cases.65
Critics of the Juvenile Court Law had taken a dim view of this
distinction for several years and it was obvious that under the holding
of Gault, this distinction no longer was valid. Gault said that the
situation wherein the child may be "found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years, is comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution." 66 Thus, it was clear that since a violation of

58 Cal. 2d 848, 377 P.2d 74 (1962).
61 Id. at 853, 377 P.2d at 77.
62 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1967).
63 CAL. WELF. & INsu'IS CODE §§ 601, 602.
64 CAL. WELF. & INsT'xS CODE § 634, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1967, ch.
60

1356, § 4; CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 700, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1967, ch.

1356, § 10.
65 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2, at 3475, 3481 (formerly Cal. Welf. &
Inst'ns Code §§ 634, 700).
66 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
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section 602 (which provides for juvenile court wardship of any person
under the age of 21 who violates "any law ...

or any ordinance ...

defining crime"),67 might result in commitment to the Youth Authority until the age of 21,68 it was no longer possible to deny the right to
appointed counsel to the indigent charged with misconduct which
would constitute a misdemeanor if committed by an adult.

Nothing in the precise holding of the Gault case would affect
California's dependent children procedures under section 600,69 since

under section 72770 they may not be committed to a state institution.
But what about the so-called "incorrigible" portion of the Juvenile
Court Law, section 601,71 which provides in substance that one comes
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court who persistently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable orders of his parents, custodian
or school authorities, or who is beyond the control of such persons,
or who is a habitual truant from school, or who "from any cause is in
danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life"? This is
"cpure" Juvenile Court Law and, of course, finds no counterpart in our
criminal law. A finding against a minor under this section does not
give72the judge the jurisdiction to commit him to the Youth Authority, but a finding of a violation of a court order subsequent to a finding under 601 does permit the judge to commit the minor to the Youth
Authority.7 3 Thus, the clear potential of a commitment to a state institution existed upon a finding under section 601.
The legislature met the right-to-counsel issue head-on, and in a
series of amendments clearly complied with the mandate of Gault.
All mention of the distinction between misdemeanors and felonies
was removed from the Juvenile Court Law; the word "indigent" was
removed and in its place substituted "unable to afford counsel"; and
the appointment of counsel was made mandatory in all 601 and 602
cases "whether he is unable to afford counsel or not unless there is an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. ' 74 These provisions pertain to both the detention hearing and the jurisdictional hearing.
It would appear that the legislature has fully met the challenge
of the Gault case in regard to the right to counsel.
Last, as to confrontation, self-incrimination, and cross-examination.
67 CAL. WELF.
68 CAL. WELF.
69 CAL. WELF.
70 CAL. WELF.
71 CAL. WELP.

& INST'NS CODE
& INST'NS CODE

§ 602 (emphasis added).
§ 731.

& INST'Ns CODE § 600.
& INST'NS CODE § 727.
& INSTNS CODE § 601.

72 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE

73 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE

§ 730.
§§ 602, 731.

74 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 634, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1967, ch.
1356, § 4; CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE § 700, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1967, ch.
1356, § 10.
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This brings us to the very troublesome problem of section 70175
which represents the most valorous effort of the Governor's Commission and, in turn, the legislature, to bridge the gap between the parens
patriae theory of the social welfare advocates and the complaints of
the Constitutionalists. This section provides that at the jurisdictional
hearing the court should first consider only the question of whether
the minor is a person described by section 600 (dependent), 601 (incorrigible), or 602 (violation of law); and for this purpose:
[A]ny matter or information relevant and material to the circumstances or acts which are alleged to bring him within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court is admissible and may be received in evidence;
however, a preponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial
of criminal cases, must be adduced to support a finding that the
minor is a person described by section 602, and a preponderance of
evidence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by
sections 600 or 601.70
This section has already been the subject of review and comment by
appellate courts.
In the case of In re Castro77 an illegally obtained confession was
received in evidence by the juvenile court. The court held that
[t]he procedure expounded in the Escobedo, Dorado and Miranda
cases does not apply to juvenile court litigation so as to require the
reversal of any proceeding in which the evidence of a confession to a
proof of the preliminary
peace officer has been admitted without
18
warnings required in criminal cases.
Therefore, since there was sufficient evidence independent of the illegally obtained confession on which the allegations of the petition
could be sustained by a preponderance of evidence legally admissible
in the trial of a criminal case, the finding of the court was upheld.
This holding was followed in In re Acuna 7 9 and artfully dodged
s6
in the case of In re Buros.
The obvious question is whether under Gault, there could still be
admitted constitutionally prohibited, illegally obtained evidence, the
admission of which would be reversible error in the adult courts, provided there is other "relevant and material" evidence admissible in a
criminal case sufficient to sustain the finding. Again, the language
of the Gault case lacks a certain clarity in this aspect of the holding.
Some language would indicate that constitutionally prohibited evidence should not, under any circumstance, be admitted against the
minor:
It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimi75 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 701.
76 Id. (emphasis added).
77 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
78 Id. at 409, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
79 245 Cal. App. 2d 388, 53 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966).
80 249 A.C.A. 61, 57 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1967).
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nation were available to hardened criminals but not to children. The
language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception ....
It is true that the statement of the privilege in the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." However, it is also clear that
the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the
statement or admission and the exposure which it invites ....
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the ground that these can not
lead to "criminal" involvement.8 1
This language would indicate that constitutionally prohibited evidence
should not be admitted, regardless of the language of the local juvenile court law. On the other hand, further along in the opinion appears the already quoted statement that the court recognizes the recommendations of the Children's Bureau of Standards for Juvenile
and Family Courts which "provide that testimony should be under
oath and that only competent material and relevant evidence under
82
rules applicable to civil cases should be admitted in evidence."
In this connection the reaction of the legislature was peculiar
to say the least. Without changing a word in section 701, the legislature, in an obvious attempt to comply with (or outdo) Gault, provided:
(1) That when the minor is taken into temporary custody by
the police officer, the officer shall "advise such minor that anything
he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to have
counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have coun83
sel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel."
(2) That when the minor is taken before the probation officer,
that officer shall again immediately advise the minor in exactly the
same terms set forth above and if the minor requests counsel, the
84
probation officer shall advise the judge who shall appoint counsel.
(3) At the detention hearing "the minor has a privilege against
self-incrimination and has a right to confrontation by, and cross-exam-

ination of, witnesses."8 5
81 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 (1967).
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(4) At the jurisdictional hearing under section 701 or the dispositional hearing under section 702, the minor has a "privilege against
self-incrimination and has a right to confrontation by, and cross-examination of, witnesses."88
The effect of these amendments on section 701 obviously awaits
appellate interpretation.
While Gault did not demand the right to appeal or a complete
record, the 1961 law did provide the right to appeal 7 and for a court
reporter.88 A 1967 amendment provides that the appellant unable to
afford counsel is to be provided a free copy of the transcript.8 9 This
amendment undoubtedly complies with any conceivable attack on the
appeal sections of the California Law.
Since the right of confrontation is an empty one unless witnesses
are available, the 1967 legislature remedied a long-standing oversight
by providing for payment by the county of witness fees in the juvenile
court.9 0
Left unanswered by Gault and still a matter of pure speculation
and surmise is the question of whether the minor who is brought before the court solely on the basis of the violation of a criminal statute
is entitled to the rest of the constitutional rights of an adult charged
with the same offense, such as bail pending the hearing, a jury trial,
the presumption of innocence, and the right to demand that the
proof of his alleged violation be beyond a reasonable doubt and to a
moral certainty. Certainly the far-ranging language of the decision
could give aid and comfort to both the Purists and the Constitutionalists in regard to these rights.
These are questions which Gault does not attempt to answer.
Any effort to outguess the future would be pure folly and a classic
exercise in futility. But one thing is undisputed-the battle between
the Purists and Constitutionalists will continue.
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